CCP β†’ Module 3 β†’ Lesson 3.3

πŸ” Threat Intelligence & Hunting

From reactive defense to proactive pursuitβ€”finding threats before they find you

⏱️ 120 minutes πŸ“– Lesson 3 of 4 🎯 Advanced

Introduction: The Hunter's Mindset

"The best defense is knowing your enemy better than they know themselves." β€” Sun Tzu (paraphrased for cybersecurity)

Traditional security is reactive: wait for an alert, investigate, respond. But sophisticated attackers evade detectionβ€”they live off the land, blend with normal traffic, and move slowly to avoid triggering thresholds. The average dwell time (time from breach to detection) is still 204 days (IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2023).

Threat intelligence and threat hunting flip the script. Instead of waiting for alerts, we proactively search for adversaries using knowledge of their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). We become the hunters, not the hunted.

🎯 Lesson Objectives

By the end of this lesson, you will be able to:

  • Explain the threat intelligence lifecycle and its applications
  • Navigate and apply the MITRE ATT&CK framework for threat analysis
  • Distinguish between IOCs and TTPs and use both effectively
  • Design and execute hypothesis-driven threat hunts
  • Build a practical threat intelligence program

1. Threat Intelligence Fundamentals

1.1 What is Threat Intelligence?

Definition

Threat Intelligence is evidence-based knowledge about threatsβ€”including context, mechanisms, indicators, implications, and actionable adviceβ€”that can inform decisions about responding to threats.

β€” Gartner

Threat intelligence is NOT just a feed of malicious IP addresses. True intelligence provides context: Who is attacking? Why? What are their capabilities? How do they operate? What should we do about it?

1.2 The Intelligence Pyramid

Strategic Intelligence

High-level trends, threat landscape, risk to business

Audience: C-Suite, Board, Risk Management

Example: "Nation-state actors are increasingly targeting financial sector"

Tactical Intelligence

TTPs, attack patterns, threat actor profiles

Audience: Security Architects, SOC Managers

Example: "APT29 uses OAuth token theft for persistent access"

Operational Intelligence

Specific campaigns, imminent threats, attack timelines

Audience: Incident Responders, Threat Hunters

Example: "Active campaign targeting Indian banks using XYZ malware"

Technical Intelligence

IOCs: IPs, domains, file hashes, URLs

Audience: SOC Analysts, Security Tools

Example: "Block IP 192.168.1.100, hash SHA256:abc123..."

1.3 The Intelligence Lifecycle

1

Direction

Define intelligence requirements. What do stakeholders need to know?

2

Collection

Gather raw data from internal/external sources (logs, feeds, OSINT, HUMINT)

3

Processing

Normalize, filter, correlate, and enrich raw data

4

Analysis

Convert data into actionable intelligence with context

5

Dissemination

Deliver intelligence to stakeholders in appropriate format

6

Feedback

Evaluate effectiveness, refine requirements, improve process

πŸ’‘ Real-World Example: APT40 (Leviathan) Intelligence

In July 2021, multiple governments attributed cyber espionage to China's Ministry of State Security (MSS), specifically APT40. The intelligence lifecycle in action:

  1. Direction: "Are we targeted by Chinese state actors?"
  2. Collection: Government advisories, vendor reports, internal logs
  3. Processing: Extract IOCs, map to MITRE ATT&CK, correlate with internal data
  4. Analysis: "APT40 targets maritime/defense; our organization is relevant"
  5. Dissemination: Brief executives on risk, provide SOC with detection rules
  6. Feedback: "Did we detect any APT40 activity after deploying rules?"

2. MITRE ATT&CK Framework

MITRE ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) is the Rosetta Stone of cybersecurityβ€”a globally-accessible knowledge base of adversary behavior based on real-world observations.

2.1 Understanding the Structure

Component Definition Example
Tactics The adversary's goalβ€”the "why" of an attack Initial Access, Persistence, Exfiltration
Techniques How the adversary achieves the goal Phishing (T1566), Registry Run Keys (T1547)
Sub-techniques Specific variation of a technique Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001)
Procedures Specific implementation by threat actor APT29 uses OAuth apps for persistence

2.2 The 14 Tactics (Enterprise Matrix)

1. Reconnaissance

Gathering information about the target

2. Resource Development

Creating attack infrastructure

3. Initial Access

Getting into the network

4. Execution

Running malicious code

5. Persistence

Maintaining foothold

6. Privilege Escalation

Gaining higher permissions

7. Defense Evasion

Avoiding detection

8. Credential Access

Stealing credentials

9. Discovery

Learning about the environment

10. Lateral Movement

Moving through network

11. Collection

Gathering target data

12. Command & Control

Communicating with malware

13. Exfiltration

Stealing data out

14. Impact

Disrupting/destroying systems

2.3 Using ATT&CK for Defense

πŸ” Detection Engineering

Map your detection rules to ATT&CK techniques. Identify gapsβ€”which techniques have no detection coverage?

Example: "We detect 60% of Credential Access techniques but only 20% of Defense Evasion"

🎯 Threat Hunting

Use ATT&CK to prioritize hunts based on techniques used by relevant threat actors.

Example: "APT41 uses T1055 (Process Injection)β€”let's hunt for this in our environment"

πŸ“Š Security Assessment

Test your defenses against specific techniques. Purple team exercises with ATT&CK mapping.

Example: "Can we detect Kerberoasting (T1558.003)? Let's test it."

πŸ“‹ Incident Analysis

Document incidents using ATT&CK terminology for consistent, shareable analysis.

Example: "Attack chain: T1566.001 β†’ T1059.001 β†’ T1055 β†’ T1003"

πŸ’‘ ATT&CK in Practice: WannaCry Mapped

The 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack mapped to ATT&CK:

  • T1210 (Exploitation of Remote Services): Exploited EternalBlue (MS17-010) for SMB
  • T1059.003 (Windows Command Shell): Executed via command line
  • T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact): Encrypted files with AES/RSA
  • T1490 (Inhibit System Recovery): Deleted shadow copies

This mapping helps defenders: "If we block T1210 via patching, the entire chain breaks."

3. Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) vs TTPs

3.1 The Pyramid of Pain

Security researcher David Bianco created the "Pyramid of Pain" to illustrate how much pain different indicators cause adversaries when defenders detect them:

TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, Procedures)

TOUGH! Adversaries must change their entire methodology

Tools

Challengingβ€”requires new tools development

Network/Host Artifacts

Annoyingβ€”requires operational changes

Domain Names

Simpleβ€”register new domains cheaply

IP Addresses

Easyβ€”use new VPS, proxy, Tor

Hash Values

Trivialβ€”recompile malware, one bit changes hash

3.2 Types of Indicators

Indicator Type Examples Lifespan Detection Value
Hash (MD5, SHA256) Malware file hashes Hours-Days Low (easily changed)
IP Addresses C2 server IPs Days-Weeks Low-Medium
Domain Names Phishing/C2 domains Days-Months Medium
Network Artifacts User-Agent strings, JA3 hashes Months Medium-High
Host Artifacts Registry keys, file paths, mutexes Months Medium-High
TTPs Attack patterns, behaviors Years Highest

⚠️ The IOC Trap

Many organizations focus heavily on IOC blocking (IP/domain/hash lists) because it's easy to automate. But this creates a false sense of security:

  • IOCs are lagging indicatorsβ€”they're known only after an attack
  • Sophisticated attackers change IOCs constantly
  • Zero-day attacks have no known IOCs

Better approach: Use IOCs for quick wins, but invest in TTP-based detection (behavioral analytics, anomaly detection) for lasting defense.

4. Threat Hunting: The Proactive Pursuit

"Threat hunting is like being a detectiveβ€”you don't wait for someone to report a crime; you look for evidence that one might be happening."

4.1 What is Threat Hunting?

Threat Hunting is the proactive, iterative search through networks and datasets to detect threats that evade existing automated security solutions.

Key characteristics that distinguish hunting from traditional SOC operations:

  • Proactive: Not triggered by alertsβ€”initiated by hunters
  • Hypothesis-driven: Based on intelligence, not just data
  • Iterative: Findings lead to new hypotheses
  • Human-led: Requires analyst intuition and creativity

4.2 The Hunting Loop

1

Create Hypothesis

Based on threat intel, ATT&CK, or intuition: "APT29 may be using OAuth token theft in our M365 environment"

2

Investigate

Query logs, analyze data, look for evidence of the hypothesis

3

Discover Patterns

Find anomalies, suspicious activity, or confirm benign behavior

4

Create/Update Analytics

Turn findings into detection rules for automation

5

Inform & Enrich

Document findings, update threat intel, improve defenses

4.3 Hunting Techniques

πŸ“Š Statistical Analysis

Look for outliers: rare processes, unusual network connections, abnormal data volumes.

Example: "Which workstations have the most unique outbound connections?"

πŸ”— Stack Counting

Count occurrences of artifacts. Rare items may indicate compromise.

Example: "This scheduled task exists on only 1 of 10,000 machinesβ€”investigate!"

⏱️ Temporal Analysis

Look for activity at unusual times or suspicious patterns over time.

Example: "Authentication from India at 3 AM local time every Sunday"

🎯 TTP-Based Hunting

Hunt for specific techniques from MITRE ATT&CK or threat reports.

Example: "Search for LSASS memory access (T1003.001)"

4.4 Sample Hunt: Detecting Kerberoasting

🎯 Hunt: Kerberoasting (T1558.003)

Hypothesis

Attackers may be requesting TGS tickets for service accounts to crack offline (Kerberoasting).

Data Sources
  • Windows Security Event Logs (Event ID 4769)
  • Domain Controller logs
Hunt Query (Pseudo-code)
SELECT source_user, COUNT(DISTINCT service_name) as services_requested
FROM security_events
WHERE event_id = 4769
  AND ticket_encryption_type IN (0x17, 0x18)  -- RC4 encryption (weak)
  AND service_name NOT LIKE '%$'               -- Exclude machine accounts
GROUP BY source_user
HAVING services_requested > 10                 -- Threshold for suspicion
ORDER BY services_requested DESC
                            
Expected Findings
  • Normal: Users request 1-5 services occasionally
  • Suspicious: Single user requesting TGS for 50+ services in short time
  • Indicators: RC4 encryption requested (downgrade attack)
Response Actions
  • Investigate the requesting account
  • Check service accounts for weak passwords
  • Implement Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)
  • Create detection rule for future alerts

5. Building a Threat Intelligence Program

5.1 Intelligence Sources

Source Type Examples Pros Cons
Open Source (OSINT) AlienVault OTX, MISP, Twitter, Blogs Free, community-driven Quality varies, may be outdated
Commercial Feeds Recorded Future, Mandiant, CrowdStrike Curated, contextualized Expensive, vendor lock-in
Government/ISACs CERT-In, FS-ISAC, NCIIPC Sector-specific, authoritative May be slow, limited scope
Internal Telemetry Your own logs, incidents, hunts Highly relevant, unique Requires analysis capability
Dark Web Monitoring Paste sites, forums, markets Early warning of breaches Legal/ethical considerations

5.2 India-Specific Intelligence Sources

πŸ›οΈ CERT-In

Indian Computer Emergency Response Team. Mandatory breach reporting destination under IT Act. Publishes advisories and vulnerability notes.

Website: cert-in.org.in

πŸ”’ NCIIPC

National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre. Protects critical sectors: power, banking, telecom.

Sectors: Critical infrastructure threat intel

🏦 RBI Cyber Security

Reserve Bank of India issues sector-specific guidance and threat information for financial sector.

Focus: Banking, payment systems

πŸ“‘ DSCI

Data Security Council of India. Industry body with threat intelligence sharing initiatives.

Focus: Industry collaboration

5.3 Threat Intelligence Platform (TIP) Workflow

Threat Intelligence Platform Workflow:

β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
β”‚                    INTELLIGENCE SOURCES                      β”‚
β”‚  Commercial Feeds β”‚ OSINT β”‚ CERT-In β”‚ Internal β”‚ Dark Web   β”‚
β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜
                              β”‚
                              β–Ό
β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
β”‚                    THREAT INTEL PLATFORM                     β”‚
β”‚  β€’ Aggregate & Normalize                                     β”‚
β”‚  β€’ Enrich with context                                       β”‚
β”‚  β€’ Score & Prioritize                                        β”‚
β”‚  β€’ Correlate with internal data                              β”‚
β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜
                              β”‚
            β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”Όβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
            β–Ό                 β–Ό                 β–Ό
    β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”     β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”     β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
    β”‚   SIEM    β”‚     β”‚  Firewall β”‚     β”‚   EDR     β”‚
    β”‚ Detection β”‚     β”‚  Blocking β”‚     β”‚ Alerting  β”‚
    β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜     β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜     β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜
                              β”‚
                              β–Ό
β”Œβ”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”
β”‚                    SOC / HUNT TEAM                           β”‚
β”‚  β€’ Investigate alerts                                        β”‚
β”‚  β€’ Conduct hunts                                             β”‚
β”‚  β€’ Feedback to TIP                                           β”‚
β””β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”€β”˜
                    

πŸ“ Key Takeaways

1

Threat intelligence exists at four levels: strategic, tactical, operational, technicalβ€”each serves different stakeholders

2

MITRE ATT&CK provides common language for describing adversary behaviorβ€”use it for detection, hunting, and analysis

3

TTPs cause more pain to adversaries than IOCsβ€”invest in behavioral detection over blocklists

4

Threat hunting is hypothesis-driven, proactive search for threats that evade automated detection

5

A threat intel program combines multiple sources (OSINT, commercial, government, internal) with proper workflow

βœ… Lesson Complete!

You've mastered threat intelligence and hunting fundamentals. Next: Digital Forensics & Evidence Handling.